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IS THE INTERNET OVER?! (AGAIN?)1 
JAMES BOYLE† 
About 30 years ago, in March of 1989, a British man wrote a 
memo to his boss. The memo had the remarkably boring title, 
Information Management: A Proposal. It looked like this2:  
 
1 This article is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution, Non 
Commercial, Sharealike license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
sa/3.0/.   
† William Neal Reynolds Professor of Law, Duke Law School.   
2 Tim Berners-Lee, Information Management: A Proposal, CERN (Mar. 1989),  
http://info.cern.ch/Proposal.html. 
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The memo came back with his boss’s annotation on it. “Vague 
but exciting…”  
Both adjectives were well-chosen. The man was Tim Berners-
Lee. Now Sir Tim Berners-Lee. The proposal? Oh, nothing big. Just the 
World Wide Web. Berners-Lee’s memo was something that started as a 
proposal for information management inside of CERN, the European 
Nuclear Research organization, and became the framework for the World 
Wide Web. You know, those three little letters in your browser bar? 
WWW?  
Dispensing with the cumbersome protocols of the time, Berners-
Lee envisioned a web of information, linked together by a language 
called html (hypertext markup language), a precise geography provided 
by Uniform Resource Identifiers (think the URL’s of web addresses) and 
finally a method of transfer, http (the hypertext transfer protocol that you 
can still see in the address of the sites in your web browser). By 1990 he 
had written each of these protocols.  
I teach at a law school that has world-class faculty and brilliant 
students. Their breadth of learning humbles me on a daily basis. But 
many of them do not understand the network architecture that is so 
central to their lives. Of course, it is not their specialty. Yet they 
understand the basic explanation of anthropogenic climate-change, the 
idea of externalities in economics, the broad strokes of the history of 
civil rights in the United States, the debate about whether minimum 
wages are good for poor workers and the issues raised by the use of 
drones in armed conflict. They fluently invoke the concept of noir 
cinema and make jokes about magical realist fiction when a faculty 
meeting turns bizarre. They are, in short, profoundly well-rounded, 
educated people, knowledgeable beyond their own specialties. But they 
do not really understand the internet or the world wide web. That is a 
shame.  
It is a shame because understanding the most important 
communications network of our time, the network for our culture and 
news and search and flirting and shopping and politics, is central to 
knowing how—or whether—to regulate it. To build on it. To use it. As I 
will try to explain, some of the features of the internet that its critics view 
as its main problems—anonymity, the fact that anyone can connect to the 
internet and say anything, the difficulty of filtering it or managing it, its 
decentralized anarchic governance—are also among its transformative 
and engaging features. It is a shame for us not to understand all this 
because the network that shapes our cognitive world, defines our 
markets, and runs our infrastructure is as important as the rest of the 
things a “well-rounded person” knows about. But it is also a shame 
No. 1]                 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW                    34 
 
because Berners-Lee’s idea was beautiful. It was an idea that a scholar 
would come up with and that a scholar would love. Now it is central to 
our world. Yet somehow it progressed from bizarre novelty to essential 
utility without ever passing through the intermediate stage of public 
comprehension. 
Berners-Lee imagined a republic of ideas built on a vision of 
language. The whole thing had a whiff of Harry Potter magic. To click 
on the hyperlink was to summon its referent. The name was the magical 
command for the presence of the resource, as though every footnote 
animated itself, went to the library and brought you back the relevant 
book. To write a web page was to build a transporter of the mind. The 
link was a reference to the resource, a map to the place where the 
resource was held and a vehicle to take you there. Each new document 
wove the network a little wider and tighter. That’s why they called it the 
world wide web. And its architecture was “distributed.” Anyone could 
build the web—as if we could all wander outside our houses and build 
the Eisenhower freeways of the mind ourselves, draw the maps that 
chronicled those freeways, assemble the cars that traveled along them 
and then construct the libraries, bookstores, shops, coffee houses and red 
light districts to which they journeyed. All done through a decentralized 
process that required neither governmental permission, nor 
authentication of your content—for better or worse. Better and worse. 
The network had no central controller, no authority that must 
authenticate or vet, no central node through which all connections 
passed.  Writing back in 1997, I tried to summarize the attraction of this 
architecture to libertarians, starting with the famous quotation “The Net 
interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.” 
This quote from John Gilmore, one of the founders of the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, has the twin advantages of being pithy and 
technologically accurate. The Internet[’s] . . . distributed 
architecture and its technique of packet switching were designed to 
get messages delivered despite blockages, holes, and malfunctions. 
Imagine the poor censor faced with such a system. There is no 
central exchange to seize and hold; messages actively “seek out” 
alternative routes so that even if one path is blocked another may 
open up. Here was the civil libertarian’s dream: a technology with a 
comparatively low cost of entry to speakers and listeners alike, 
technologically resistant to censorship, yet politically and 
economically important enough that it cannot easily be ignored. The 
Internet offers obvious advantages to the countries, research 
communities, cultures, and companies that use it, but it is extremely 
hard to control the amount and type of information available; access 
is like a tap that only has two settings–“off” and “full.” For 
governments, this has been seen as one of the biggest problems 
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posed by the Internet. To the Internet’s devotees, most of whom 
embrace some variety of libertarianism, the Internet’s structural 
resistance to censorship, or any externally imposed filtration, is “not 
a bug but a feature.”3 
It was not merely the network’s distributed nature or its 
resistance to censorship that attracted attention. It was the degree of 
freedom it gave its users. The network imposed no barriers to what could 
pass over its fibers, so long as that content could be broken down into 
packets. It was based on an “end-to-end architecture.” It imposed no 
judgment about what would be done at either end of its connections. This 
was not just a network of terminals, like many of its earlier digital 
antecedents such as Ceefax or Minitel. It did not limit connection to 
devices hardwired to perform only a few defined functions, such as an 
ATM or an airline check-in kiosk. The ATM will not give you the 
weather and the check-in kiosk cannot produce pictures of your 
grandchildren.4 Terminal design = control of user. This is the genius of 
Larry Lessig’s focus on architecture as regulation. But this was not a 
network of terminals. If you plugged in a general purpose computer at 
either end of this network, you could do whatever software on a general 
purpose computer could do. Chat? Music? Video remix? Flirting? 
Arranging calendars? Generating knitting patterns? Doing facial 
recognition or portfolio analysis? Making a tribute to a departed loved 
one? Looking in on your babysitter while you are on a date? Managing 
just-in-time inventory through the same system that handled your 
customer orders? Generating encrypted communications that your 
despotic government could not read? Creating a message board on which 
you discovered that you were not in fact the only gay teenager in the 
world, it just seemed that way? So long as the software could be written 
 
3 James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty and 
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 178–79 (1997) (footnotes omitted). 
To be fair, all of this was in the context of criticizing the naivete of hardcore 
digital libertarianism. Even back then academic commentators, including me, 
stressed that such claims relied on a form of technological essentialism— 
assuming that the current form of the network was in some sense canonical—
and stressed the possibility of “hard wired censors” which could in fact tame the 
supposedly unregulable internet. The best example of those hard wired censors 
was to be the Great Firewall of China. Id.; More importantly, see LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). Since we were among 
naïve libertarianism’s principal critics, it is mildly annoying to have the views 
we criticized attributed to us. 
4 Just to clarify: “The grandchildren are in the Facebook. The Facebook lives in 
the Google.” The advanced class deals with how one gets to the Google by 
rebooting the router. 
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and the information broken into packets, those packets could be sent and 
received anywhere in the world.  
It was a world-changing technology, a world-changing idea. Yes, 
of course, we immediately used it for porn, copyright infringement, spam 
and videos of cats. We are human. We build glorious cathedrals and then 
scribble illiterate graffiti on their walls.  But it could do so much more, 
and it did. And thirty years ago, it did not exist. In 1991, people outside 
of CERN were invited to use this new network. Think about that for a 
moment. For all intents and purposes, the web that is so central to every 
aspect of your lives today did not exist at all until 1991. Maybe 1994, if 
you talk about mediumly-widespread public use. It is as if I told you that 
no one had thought of roads, or wheels, or air, until 25 years ago.  
There had been “an internet,” true. There had been packet-
switched network precursors or ancestors, depending on how one does 
one’s digital zoological classification. The first message was sent over 
ARPANET in 1969. TCP/IP—the protocols that collectively allow data 
to be broken into packets, addressed, transmitted and reassembled—had 
been written for ARPANET under the auspices of DARPA in the 70’s. 
Berners-Lee’s genius was to come up with the idea—and it was as much 
an idea or a language as it was a technology—that made all of the 
(brilliant, visionary) earlier development something that now everyone 
was going to want to use, dispute, monetize, subvert, romanticize and 
demonize.  
There was one more vital thing about the web that the digerati 
found noteworthy. It was built on a commons. Actually, it was built on a 
series of layers, each a commons or semi-commons, in which key aspects 
of the layer were free from the kind of control that proprietary ownership 
would have conveyed.  
First, the network. With a proprietary network like AOL 
(America OnLine) or CompuServe, the owner controls what and who can 
become part of the network. There is a right to exclude. With the web 
and the internet, the reverse was true. So long as you had the money to 
purchase a domain name, so long as you could create or rent a presence 
on a server connected to the internet, you were online, with control over 
your own site and your own content. In that sense, access was a 
commons—regulated, if at all, by the strictures and guidelines of the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)5 or the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). But those strictures were largely 
technical in nature, setting up the federated set of internet domain name 
registrars, and a process for resolving trademark disputes over domain 
 
5 See generally James Boyle, A Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital Age?, 50 
DUKE L.J. 5 (2000). 
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names, or specifying the common metadata language through which web 
pages were to express themselves. True, you had to pay a minimal fee to 
get a domain name and if you coded your webpage in non-standard html 
then it would not display properly. In that sense, there was control. But 
there was no proprietary network owner to grant or deny access.  
Second, the protocols by which the network operated were also a 
commons. For example, TCP/IP tries to make sure that the packets you 
are sending end up at the right place, in the right order. If packets are 
missed or dropped, it retransmits. But no one owns or controls TCP/IP. It 
achieved dominance precisely because it was not a proprietary system 
subject to intellectual property rights, but rather a commons that was 
open to all. And Berners-Lee’s protocols—the suite that included html, 
http and URLs—were left open as well, by explicit choice. Partly that 
was because he believed he was building on the work of those who went 
before him. Partly it was because he wanted this to be a resource held in 
common-like language. And that openness enabled others to standardize 
around its protocols without fear of holdup or control at a later stage. 
After describing how Berners-Lee worked at CERN in Switzerland 
back in the 1980s, Doan moved on to the web. When Berners-Lee 
invented the web, did he apply for a patent on it, Doan asked.  
“No,” said Berners-Lee.  
“Why not?” asked Doan.  
“The internet was already around. I was taking hypertext, and it was 
around a long time too. I was taking stuff we knew how to do…. All 
I was doing was putting together bits that had been around for years 
in a particular combination to meet the needs that I have.”  
Doan: “And who owns the web?”  
Berners-Lee: “We do.”  
. . . . 
“. . . The reason the Web took off is not because it was a magic 
idea, but because I persuaded everyone to use HTML and HTTP.”6 
Finally, by custom, nudge and occasional resort to administrative 
fiat, it was assumed that the network was and should be ‘neutral.’ 
Operators of one layer, for example your internet service provider, 
should be forbidden from discriminating between different sources of 
content of the same digital type. Video and audio streams can be treated 
differently than text, of course, because simultaneity, synching and speed 
 
6 Joe Mullin, Tim Berners-Lee Takes the Stand to Keep the Web Free, WIRED 
(Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/02/tim-berners-lee-patent/. 
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are more important there. But my ISP should not be able to prioritize 
different sources of content, sending me Youtube videos twice as fast as 
to its competitors for example, or streaming Amazon Prime videos at a 
higher rate than Netflix. The fear here was that network effects could be 
used to create dominant positions and thus to solidify incumbents, or to 
give priority to the content provided by large, vertically integrated 
communications companies with extensive portfolios of content. Imagine 
the process of Facebook trying to unseat Myspace as the dominant social 
network, for example, if Myspace could pay all service-providers to 
throttle Facebook’s content or boost its own. Imagine if only Time-
Warner’s videos played on the cable networks their parent company 
owned. The idea here was profoundly anti-incumbent, against barriers to 
entry.  
The effects were cumulative. Together, the end-to-end principle 
of network design, the censorship-resistant architecture of a packet-
switched system, the open access provided by its layers of commons, and 
the traffic-equality mandate of net-neutrality7 seemed to offer an opening 
for both anti-authoritarian politics and disruptive commerce: If one could 
“think as one wished, and speak as one thought,” to quote our colleague 
David Lange, and if a disruptive business idea could instantly reach 
world-wide without being squashed by the incumbent dinosaurs, then 
both economic and political liberty would have gained a powerful ally.  
The cheering was not only from the civil libertarian or the Ayn 
Rand sectors of the arena. By lowering the barriers to collaboration, the 
web promised to allow new forms of creativity—from Wikipedia to open 
source software. Many of these new forms of creativity were themselves 
built on a network composed of layers of commons and yielded a 
resource that itself was a commons; think of Linux or Wikipedia, articles 
or software created by strangers and released under a license that 
permitted copying and remix. And these forms of creation could take 
place outside or beside the dominant forms of commodified creativity, 
perhaps challenging our ideas about where intellectual property rights 
were necessary to incentivize innovation, perhaps sometimes adding a 
tertium quid between work and play, between homo economicus and 
homo ludens. The central reference here is Yochai Benkler’s work on the 
way in which the network should change our economic assumptions, and 
particularly our assumptions about the possibility of commons-based 
creativity.8 
 
7 Hat tip, Tim Wu, the inventor of the phrase. 
8 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Yochai Benkler, 
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It was in the context of all of this, that John Perry Barlow wrote 
the essays that are the subject of this symposium. How should we grade 
his prognostications today? Selling Wine Without Bottles probably stands 
up best to the test of time. Barlow was right that the internet would pose 
a challenge to the current forms of distribution of copyrighted content. 
He was right that encryption would eventually provide the “bottles” 
around the content we receive; every Pandora stream or Netflix video 
comes to you wrapped in walls made of code. He was right that the 
network would bring a focus on timeliness, on personal and 
uncommodifiable perspective, on relationships other than those of buyer 
and seller. This is an insight that affects every influencer on social media, 
every columnist who draws you to the New York Times rather than the 
Huffington Post, every band that builds a cadre of loyal fans who come 
to its concerts and buy its merchandise and vinyl releases. He was right 
to say that the availability of perfect digital copies on demand would 
actually make the original live experience seem more valuable, not less.9 
One can see this both from the growing proportion of musical revenues 
generated by live performances and by the increasing number of those 
performances over time. He was at least partially right that ethics and 
law were becoming increasingly out of joint.  
Widespread file-sharing of copyrighted works without 
authorization is illegal in the United States and breaking the law is a bad 
thing. Yet to the Napster generation it did not seem as if that were true. 
In our law school parking lot it is equally illegal to park in the fire lanes 
and, if one is not entitled to do so, in the handicapped spaces. My law-
abiding, law professor colleagues freely park in the first when the lot is 
full. I’ve never seen them park in the second. For a while, file-sharing 
was seen like parking illegally to run a quick errand10—running some 
risk of sanction but carrying no negative moral force. If illicit 
downloading were an exercise in bold civil disobedience that would be 
one thing, but this was—for the most part—just wanting to get away 
with getting the music without paying. That seems like a bad thing both 
for the legitimacy of law and for the backlash it would reliably generate: 
massive overreactions in attempting to regulate the network to make it 
 
Coase’s Penguin: or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 
(2002). 
9 Cf. WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS 217 (1968). This is a much-cited essay which 
is deep, insightful and completely wrong on this specific point.  
10 To defend my colleagues, the fire-lanes are large enough for the Starship 
Enterprise to land on them. Still, the disparity is remarkable. 
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more tractable, running the risk of destroying many of its most attractive 
attributes in the process.11  
Barlow was also right about one cure for lawlessness. People 
will pay for convenient, cheap, legal access. Ten years ago, file sharing 
was a principal source of music for the student demographic. Today 
almost all of my students got their music from legal streaming services. 
He was also right that it would take a long time for the music industry to 
accept that the old model was dead and that the intellectual property law 
would actually make it quite hard to create a multijurisdictional, legal, 
music streaming service. “Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating are 
taking three forms: a frenzy of deck chair rearrangement, stern warnings 
to the passengers that if she goes down, they will face harsh criminal 
penalties, and serene, glassy-eyed denial.”12 The long delay in the rollout 
of reasonably priced legal sources of digital music can indeed be 
attributed both to industry denial, and to the barriers that 100 years of 
copyright law, built up technology by technology and licensing stream 
by licensing stream, put in the way of the one-stop-shop service.  
Barlow was not right everywhere. He underestimated the ability 
of law to adapt, and to incentivize private actors to make compliance 
more profitable than illegality. His vision of property law lacks some of 
the Hohfeldian, bundle-of-rights, complexity the legal system actually 
has. He overestimated the idea that the web would be a community with 
its own ethics—something that might be true for a small group of first 
adopters, but is harder to sustain when the network contains most of the 
population of the world.  
What about A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace? 
This document—a deliberate provocation of the global elite at Davos13—
invites pushback. The full-throated claim that “cyberspace” could and 
should be a self-governing entity, free from state power, organized only 
by the dictates of custom and the Golden Rule is an easy, and 
appropriate, target for critique. When linked to the techno-libertarian 
slogans I quoted earlier such as “the Net interprets censorship as damage 
and routes around it,” it seems to substantiate the idea that these were a 
group of people who thought that the technology would automatically 
provide freedom, which would thereafter self-regulate.  
 
11 This is a theme that Pam Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto explore at length 
in their contribution to this volume, The Enigma of Digitized Property: A 
Tribute to John Perry Barlow, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 103 (2019). 
12 John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 
(2019). 
13 Written while tipsy, according to the backstory provided by Cindy Cohn, 
Inventing the Future: Barlow and Beyond, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 69 (2019). 
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In the first essay in this volume, though, a moving, personal 
reflection on Barlow’s ideas, Cory Doctorow argues for a different 
interpretation. 
[C]ontext is everything: “The Net interprets censorship as damage 
and routes around it” was a prescription as much as an observation. 
It was uttered in the context of a nascent internet whose technical 
caretakers disagreed on many ethical and technical points, but were 
united in a sense of civic duty to keep the technology open and 
universal and “free as in freedom.” Gilmore didn’t mean, “Stand 
down everyone, we’ve built a censorship-proof internet that will 
automatically maintain its integrity.” He meant, “To you, my 
comrades-in-arms who toil endlessly to make our balky, wonderful 
invention run, I say: the same measures that we take to re-knit our 
network when a technical failure tears holes in its fabric can be 
repurposed to resist censorship, to route around the nodes that have 
fallen under a censor’s thrall. Our shared civic mission, heretofore 
dedicated primarily to the technical task of preserving a forum for 
discourse, can and should be expanded to the political task of 
preserving that forum, and what’s more, the tactics that we have 
mastered so thoroughly for the former will serve us in the latter.”14  
The notion here is that people like Barlow and Gilmore and Brand were 
writing in the context of something greater than a mere technology—a 
community of technologists and activists who wanted to preserve the 
aspects of the technology that promoted human flourishing and were 
working to minimize those that subverted that goal. 
When Barlow advocated for a free internet—“free” in all the 
usefully overlapping and ambiguous senses of that word—he wasn’t 
doing so because he lacked an appreciation of the risks of a 
monopolized internet, or an internet that was under the thumb of a 
repressive state. Rather, he did so precisely because he feared that a 
globe-spanning network of ubiquitous, sensor-studded, actuating 
devices that were designed and governed without some kind of 
ethical commitment, without the pioneering spirit of the early 
internet and its yeoman smallholders who defended it from those 
who sought to dominate or pervert it, that we would arrive at a 
dystopian future where the entertainment industry’s Huxleyism was 
the means for realizing the nightmares of Orwell.15 
In Doctorow’s view, Barlow’s repeated invocation of hope was, in the 
end, a response to “peak indifference”—the moment when problems 
seem so overwhelming that it is easy to give up. But he then adds a point 
often missed by those who think Barlow was a naïve utopian. “You don't 
 
14 Cory Doctorow, Barlow’s Legacy, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 61, 62 (2019). 
15 Id. 
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found an organization like the Electronic Frontier Foundation because 
you are sanguine about the future of the internet: you do so because your 
hope for an amazing, open future is haunted by terror of a network 
suborned for the purposes of spying and control.”16 Those among us, like 
me, who are not one of the founders of the nation’s premier digital civil 
liberties organization, please raise your hands. Collectively, we may need 
to work on our definition of “naïve.” 
That theme is picked up by Cindy Cohn, the Executive Director 
of that very organization.  
Since Barlow’s death, I’ve spent a lot of time trying to ensure 
that the straw men who have Barlow’s face taped to them don’t 
overshadow the actual man . . . .   
To be fair, the real Barlow definitely was an optimist and he 
loved all attention, positive or negative. You could argue that he 
sometimes pasted his own face on that straw man. Especially in the 
Declaration, his language was expansive and visionary. You don’t 
start a legal or policy argument with: “you weary giants of flesh and 
steel.” You don’t seek nuance with: “I declare the global social 
space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies 
you seek to impose on us.” In talking about the Declaration at 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) many years later, Barlow 
admitted that when he stepped out of a party at Davos to write it, he 
was both a little drunk and trying desperately to channel Thomas 
Jefferson. So maybe some of the sweeping rebukes are just trying to 
match his original bravado.17  
But Cohn believes that this misses Barlow’s true project. She quotes a 
2015 letter of his to the Washington Post.  
I [] knew that we were building the most penetrating and total 
surveillance system that could be imagined, and I was no more 
comfortable with the Googles (which didn’t exist but predictably 
would) who would peer out through those All-Seeing Eyes than I 
was with an equally enhanced NSA, Chinese Government, or 
United States Cyber Command. However, just as Alan Kay said, 
“The best way to predict the future is to invent it,” I knew it’s also 
true that a good way to invent the future is to predict it. So I 
predicted Utopia, hoping to give Liberty a running start before the 
laws of Moore and Metcalfe delivered up what Ed Snowden now 
correctly calls “turn-key totalitarianism.” Which is now available to 
 
16 Id. at 63 (emphasis added).  
17 Cohn, supra note 13, at 69–70 (footnotes omitted). 
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a number of secretive institutions, public and private (not that 
there’s a useful distinction).18  
We should have two Barlow’s. One useful for viewpoint-
taxonomies, the naïve libertarian set of claims that is reasonably 
attributed to his own most famous essays. He did say those things, after 
all, and those essays were the assigned starting point for the symposium. 
The second Barlow would reflect his less famous, though more 
numerous, statements that he was as afraid of private power as public, 
that he was as skeptical of corporations as he was of the state.  
As for his tone, Cohn describes Barlow’s utopianism as the 
counterpart to EFF’s own careful, analogy-packed, legal reasoning.  
I would then proceed, like a good American litigator, to tie the 
liberties of the future Internet to the precedents in the founding of 
the country. I would tie anonymous online speakers to Publius of 
the Federalist Papers. I would tie the need for digital encryption to 
the physical encryption systems used by Madison and Jefferson. 
Later I would tie the fight against mass surveillance to John Otis’ 
fight against general warrants. Since Barlow’s assertions were 
factually wrong—of course people could be held accountable for 
what they did online as long as their feet touched down in the 
jurisdiction of some government somewhere—I worried that he 
risked us losing the civil liberties and human rights online that so 
many had worked so hard to win offline.  
In retrospect, we both had useful strategies for convincing 
different audiences to protect freedom online. It’s just that I aimed 
for the Supreme Court while Barlow aimed for the sky . . . .19 
Cohn takes seriously the invitation of the symposium to look forward 20 
years as well as backwards. After brainstorming with her colleagues at 
EFF she tries to answer the question, ‘what do we need to do or say 
today to invent the future we want?’ “[A] short answer could be that we 
want to win our current fights: rein in government surveillance, protect 
coders, privacy and freedom of expression, ensure neither copyright nor 
overbroad criminal laws cannot squelch freedom of expression, freedom 
to tinker or innovation online, and more . . . . But Barlow would want us 
to go further.”20  Her answer, presented “with a light touch of Barlow-
style rhetoric,” focuses both on the dangers of state power and corporate 
power, and resonates much more with the ideals of “human flourishing.” 
 
18 Letter to the Editor from John P. Barlow to the Wash. Post (sent in response to 
J. Silverman, The Internet’s First Anarchist, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2015 
(evening edition)).     
19 Cohn, supra note 13, at 70–71 (footnotes omitted).  
20 Id. at 75.  
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We are building a civilization that empowers humans as the 
users, builders and beneficiaries of technologies. Governments, 
businesses, religions, cultures, communities and robots all matter, 
but they all work under, and are transparent to, the bright light of 
the humans they serve. We’re building a society that gives power 
back to people, especially those who have been robbed of it for too 
long. We unflinchingly recognize the bias and prejudices that have 
forestalled equity and caused our visions of a just society to fall 
short, and we use the power of technology and law to ensure those 
wrongs cannot invade further into our digital societies.  
We are building a world where the users have primary control 
over their tools, devices and networks. Technology serves us, not 
the other way around, and it treats efforts to surveil, track or profile 
us as hostile measures that should be blocked. Where it cannot, we 
have protected pathways—legal, technological, policy and 
cultural—so that we can leave those walled gardens, panopticons 
and crystal prisons to build our own new worlds.21 
In his essay for this volume, A Political Economy of Utopia?,22 
Yochai Benkler notes something that most commentators miss; that 
Barlow’s work was not just skeptical of the state, but also of a world of 
creativity defined around the commodity form.  
John Perry Barlow’s two essays capture a yearning to escape 
the oppressive clutches of the two most important institutional 
forms in modernity: the state and market society. A Declaration of 
the Independence of Cyberspace is explicitly against the modern 
state. One might say, “All right, but apart from the sanitation, the 
medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh 
water system, and public health, what have the Romans ever done 
for us?” The Declaration reflected not only a libertarian utopia that 
assumed that if only the state were to back off markets will take 
care of it all, but also a left-anchored critique of the state as a 
critical site of protecting the power and privilege of elites, insistence 
that individual self-actualization demanded a state contained within 
narrow boundaries, and a deep skepticism of all forms of authority, 
as Fred Turner showed in From Counterculture to Cyberculture. 
Selling Wine Without Bottles is not against markets or payment as 
such, but rather a resistance to the totalizing vision of commodity 
exchange as all there is . . . .23  
 
21 Id. at 76.  
22 Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of Utopia, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 78 
(2019). 
23 Id. at 78 (footnotes omitted).  
45                      IS THE INTERNET OVER?! (AGAIN?)  [Vol. 18 
             
 
Benkler points out that Barlow was at least as excited about what the 
network might mean for non-commodified forms of human flourishing, 
quoting these lines from Selling Wine: 
And then there are the inexplicable pleasures of information 
itself, the joys of learning, knowing, and teaching. The strange good 
feeling of information coming into and out of oneself. Playing with 
ideas is a recreation which people must be willing to pay a lot for, 
given the market for books and elective seminars. We’d likely 
spend even more money for such pleasures if there weren’t so many 
opportunities to pay for ideas with other ideas.  
This explains much of the collective “volunteer” work which 
fills the archives, newsgroups, and databases of the Internet. Its 
denizens are not working for “nothing,” as is widely believed. 
Rather they are getting paid in something besides money. It is an 
economy which consists almost entirely of information.24  
Adding this dimension to Barlow’s ideas shows that they cannot be 
reduced to simple libertarianism.  Ayn Rand was not a noted skeptic of 
the commodity form. Benkler’s own magisterial body of scholarship, 
which defined and tried to systematize the potential, limitations and 
political economy of “commons-based peer production” has followed 
exactly this line. Yet he uses this symposium to muse about the humility-
inducing lessons the last twenty years have taught us. Earlier, I pointed 
out that one of the most fascinating characteristics of the network was 
that it was built on multiple layers and that each layer depended, in part, 
on a commons. Benkler adds a note of caution, however, about assuming 
that the status of something as a commons is in any way determinative of 
how that resource ends up being used. 
[T]he kind of optimism that typified Barlow’s writing, as well as at 
least some of my own, is much harder to sustain now that we’ve 
seen how the successes of the first generation of battles over the 
commons have turned out.  
Facebook runs over TCP/IP and WiFi. The fact that the 
underlying carrier technology and the Internet Protocol are open 
access commons turned out not to have been enough to preserve 
people’s freedom from the power of a small number of 
corporations. Both on the consumer end, like Roku, and on the 
cloud services side, Linux is everywhere. The Internet of Things 
could not run on anything other than FOSS and spectrum commons. 
And yet, these devices are all centrally controlled, and many 
function as the sensors for pervasive surveillance systems. Just as 
industrial manufacturers cheerfully emitted pollutants and effluents 
 
24 Barlow, supra note 12, at 24.    
No. 1]                 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW                    46 
 
into the commons of the air and water to externalize some of their 
costs, so too are Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple finding 
ways of constructing new bottlenecks above and below the open 
layers, creating new toll booths and points of observation, and using 
the “free” nature of the open parts of the infrastructure as low cost 
input from which to then mine our “biopolitical public domain,” as 
Julie Cohen puts it. 25 
Benkler also notes that current events seem to call for a much larger role 
for the state and do so in a way that calls into doubt the contemporary 
equivalent of Barlow’s ideas, the breathless, chiliastic wittering about the 
transformative power of the blockchain.26 
A resurgent progressive movement is fighting hard to change the 
basic narrative on how important it is to harness the state, 
accountably and democratically, to play its core roles.  
So this, to me, is the great challenge facing those of us who still 
want to think of technological change in terms of its effects on 
social relations. We need a clearer, and more fully articulated 
political economy of technology. We need a better understanding of 
what the state and the market are for, in the context of a genuine 
three-way interaction between state, market, and commons-based 
production specifically or social, nonmarket production more 
generally. And we to internalize the limits of anarchism, whether of 
the right or left spin. I see present debates over blockchain, 
cryptocurrencies, and re-decentralizing the net, and I see in them a 
rededication to the ideals that Barlow expressed so poetically. The 
words are still there, but the music seems out of sync with the beat 
of the times.27 
In Internet Utopianism and the Practical Inevitability of Law 
Julie Cohen, who Benkler quoted earlier, echoes these themes but takes 
aim at cyberlaw scholarship that she believes has suffered from drinking 
too deep of ideas like Barlow’s.  
 
25 Benkler, supra note 22, at 81–82 (footnotes omitted). To be fairer to Benkler 
than perhaps he is to himself, to me it seemed that his own work never presented 
commons status as a sufficient condition for the range of benign outcomes he 
discusses, merely as a necessary one which allowed a hitherto unlikely and 
counter-hegemonic set of ideas the possibility of success. 
26 One of the true architects of the internet, Vint Cerf, has a slide deck about 
blockchain with one slide in it. It takes the form of a flowchart. The flowchart 
box asks the question “Do I need a blockchain?” The arrow goes to a single 
answer. “No.”  Vinton G. Cerf, (@vgcerf), TWITTER, (Jul. 19, 2018, 9:49 AM) 
https://twitter.com/vgcerf/status/1019987651301081089?lang=en. True, this is 
an overstatement. But it is a nice corrective and one which, given its source, 
probably deserves our attention. 
27 Benkler, supra note 22, at 84. 
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Cyberlaw scholarship in the Barlowian mold isn’t to blame for 
the worldwide erosion of protections for fundamental rights, but it 
also hasn’t helped as much as it might have. In this essay . . . I 
identify and briefly examine three intersecting flavors of internet 
utopianism in cyberlegal thought that are worth reexamining: 
utopianism about platforms for distributed cultural and political 
production (and concomitant failure to reckon with the 
transformative force of informational capitalism); utopianism about 
anonymity as a force for institutional disruption (and concomitant 
failure to acknowledge the essential role of institutions in cabining 
the human capacity for malice and mayhem); and utopianism about 
the relationship between information and communication networks 
and human freedom (and concomitant failure to contend with the 
powerful and inherently informational mechanisms by which 
existing protections for human rights are increasingly outflanked 
and coopted). It has become increasingly apparent that functioning 
legal institutions have indispensable roles to play in protecting and 
advancing human freedom. It has also become increasingly 
apparent, however, that the legal institutions we need are different 
than the ones we have.28  
Cohen’s solutions attempt to respond to each of those failings in turn. 
She addresses the nightmare of network enthusiasts: that the very 
characteristics they lauded—openness, commons-based production, 
distributed architecture—might not only fail to produce positive 
outcomes but (under some circumstances and on some platforms) be a 
problem rather than a solution.  
The results of distributed cultural and political production also 
are not inevitably democracy-promoting, and predictions to the 
contrary have, in retrospect, come to seem extraordinarily naïve. 
The particular quality-control mechanisms that keep open source 
software robust and secure and Wikipedia reliable and (mostly) 
objective work far less well (or not at all) within massively-
intermediated environments that are optimized to advertiser-driven 
platform revenue models. In such environments, the vaunted 
“wisdom of crowds” is a scalar, not a vector. Algorithmic processes 
optimized to boost click-through rates and prompt social sharing 
heighten the volatility of online interactions, and surveillant 
assemblages designed to enhance capabilities for content targeting 
and behavioral marketing create powerful––and easily weaponized–
–stimulus-response feedback loops. The result is a sociotechnical 
 
28 Julie E. Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the Practical Inevitability of Law, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85, 85–86 (2019). 
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apparatus that is also optimized for stoking outrage and deepening 
preexisting political, ideological, and cultural divisions.29 
Or, to put it less elegantly: reality today.  
In Revisiting Barlow’s Misplaced Optimism Ben Edelman also 
casts a dubious eye on Barlow’s predictions.  
Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace 
calls for a “civilization of the mind in cyberspace,” and he says it 
will be “more humane and fair” than what governments created. 
Barlow’s vision is unapologetically optimistic, easily embraced by 
anyone who longs for better times to come. Yet twenty years later, 
it’s easy to see some important respects in which reality fell short of 
his vision. Alongside the Internet’s many pluses are clickbait, 
scams, hacks, and all manner of privacy violations. Ten thousand 
hours of cat videos may be delightful, but they’re no civilization of 
the mind. With a bit of hindsight, Barlow’s techno-utopianism looks 
as stilted as other utopianism—and equally far removed from 
reality.30 
Edelman faults Barlow for failing to envisage the institutions that would 
bring about a better world. After listing a series of government successes, 
he also suggests that the state has a much more robust role to play than 
Barlow envisaged and that Barlow was wrong to lay such stress on the 
Golden Rule, of “do as you would be done by.” “But the moral 
suasion—and practical effectiveness—of the Golden Rule presupposes 
participants of roughly equal power and status. It is no small feat to 
meaningfully consider what Joe User might want from Mega Social 
Network if the tables were turned and Joe owned the goliath.”31  
On one level Edelman’s argument seems like a moral category-
error. The common sense moral norm, ‘one should treat others as one 
would like to be treated oneself’ does not depend on a capability 
assessment. The heavyweight champion of the world could certainly beat 
me up for no reason. Nevertheless, according to that norm, he is still 
wrong to beat me up because he would not like to be brutalized for no 
reason himself, even if it had to be by someone with a gun or an M1 
tank. The same is true of the Golden Rule’s more formal instantiation in 
Kantian moral theory. “Act only in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” does 
not depend on the size of my biceps, bank account or gun collection, nor 
those of the counterparties with whom I deal. To my knowledge, no one 
 
29 Id. at 88 (footnotes omitted).  
30 Benjamin Edelman, Revisiting Barlow’s Misplaced Optimism, 18 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 97, 97 (2019) (footnotes omitted).  
31 Id. 
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in the long history of Kantian moral thought has ever suggested 
otherwise. So I have to disagree on that portion of Edelman’s analysis. 
The Golden Rule does not depend morally on participants of roughly 
equal power and status. Indeed, its principal function as a normative 
thought-primer is to force the more powerful to restrain themselves by 
asking the question, “how would I like it if I were in the position of 
powerless supplicant in this situation?” That is the point of the thought 
exercise. With participants of roughly equal power and status there 
would be much less need for the Golden Rule in the first place. 
Yet on another level, Edelman has an undeniable point, albeit in 
a different register. Barlow was addressing himself, as Doctorow puts it, 
to the yeoman smallholders of a budding network. The moral problem 
with Barlow’s argument is not that Facebook has more power than me, 
and thus it is allowed—under the Golden Rule—to invade my privacy 
because I cannot meaningfully threaten to invade its privacy. That just 
takes us back to the normative category-error of me and the heavyweight 
champion. The problem is that Facebook is a collection of contracts, not 
an actual moral being. One can still apply Barlow’s framework to the 
legal entity, the legal fiction, formed out of those contracts—the people 
who signed them would presumably not like their privacy to be violated. 
We can tell the corporation’s managers that they must act as if the norm 
underlying their actions would become a universal law and there is 
nothing incoherent in that command. Indeed, the justified outrage that 
Edelman displays about corporate misdeeds, and his consequent criticism 
of Barlow for undervaluing the role of the state, depends on exactly those 
kind of moral intuitions. Still, it is more of a leap, cognitively speaking. 
The Golden Rule still has moral force and normative coherence as it 
confronts the corporate personality and the faceless algorithm. But, for 
different reasons, neither is likely to pay it much mind. The problem is 
not moral coherence, but enforcement. In the speech communities within 
which algorithm or corporation are constituted, the Golden Rule either 
does not exist as an internalized norm, or exists only because of 
government mandates of the kind Edelman is advocating. I would restate 
his argument thus: only the state has the power, status and administrative 
capability to become the Kantian superego of corporations and Barlow is 
wrong to neglect that fact. It is hard to deny that Edelman wins that 
argument. 
In that regard, Edelman points out some of the digital 
achievements of the state. He points out the success the state has had in 
reining in the most clear-cut violations of copyright and the progress it 
has made on online scams. While Edelman thinks there is much work to 
be done—whether in competition policy or cyberbullying—he takes a 
longer time-frame, one that makes him cautiously optimistic. 
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A century ago, the Pure Food and Drug Act sought to assure 
accurate labeling, purity, and ultimately safety to products 
Americans consume every day. By all accounts this seemed difficult 
at the time. What stops a factory from changing its process or 
ingredients when the inspector leaves? And who’s to say what 
consequences a drug might entail years later[?] Yet today the FDA 
achieves substantial success, and the problems of that era are 
delightfully in the past.  
A generation later, the GI Bill of Rights stood for the principle 
that after defending the nation, a serviceman deserved a quality 
education and the reliable job it would usually bring. The next 
generation established Medicare—a safety net to assure that our 
nation’s elderly would get sustenance and medical care befitting the 
nation’s prosperity. For both of these, there were serious questions 
about cost and sustainability from the outset—but the moral 
imperative was clear, and the projects went forward. I never 
discussed these subjects with Barlow, and so far as I know he never 
wrote about them or spoke publicly about them. But each of these 
programs faced genuine challenges, arguably at least as 
fundamental as the technology architecture Barlow considered so 
important. We should be emboldened by our prior successes and no 
less willing to take on great challenges as we look ahead.32 
Another cluster of essays in this volume focuses more centrally 
on the past and future of digital intellectual property. In their 
contribution, The Enigma of Digital Property: A Tribute to John Perry 
Barlow,33 Pam Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto carefully assess the 
legacy of Barlow’s ideas, and those of his fellow travelers, about 
copyright online. Like me, they give his predictions a good grade, but 
think that he underestimated the possibility that copyright law could be 
changed to deal with the digital world, sometimes in ways that threatened 
the freedoms Barlow cared so much about. They use as an example, the 
recent lobbying over Articles 11 and 13 of the EU’s Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market. Article 13, which makes online 
platforms liable if copyright infringing material is uploaded to them, has 
been roundly condemned.  
Critics have argued that Article 13 would effectively mandate 
monitoring and filtering across all platforms, violating user privacy 
and free speech interests as automated systems would be obliged to 
scan all content and block even legitimate, noninfringing uses of 
copyrighted work such as quotations and parodies. Article 13 also 
 
32 Id. at 102 (footnotes omitted).  
33 Pamela Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto, The Enigma of Digital Property: 
A Tribute to John Perry Barlow, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 103 (2019). 
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raises competition concerns, as it would likely favor and entrench 
major existing platforms, which already have or can afford to 
implement the necessary surveillance and filtering technologies, 
while disadvantaging smaller and newer entrants to the market.  
Dozens of European intellectual property (IP) scholars have 
written articles criticizing the Article 13 filtering mandate on 
various grounds, including the threat it poses for freedom of 
expression on the Internet . . . In addition, Tim Berners-Lee, Vint 
Cerf, and numerous other Internet pioneers signed an open letter 
urging the EU Parliament to drop Article 13:  
By requiring Internet platforms to perform automatic 
filtering [on] all of the content that their users upload, 
Article 13 takes an unprecedented step towards the 
transformation of the Internet from an open platform for 
sharing and innovation, into a tool for the automated 
surveillance and control of its users.  
More than 145 civil society organizations have expressed 
opposition to adoption of Article 13, as have more than 5 million 
people who signed a petition against it.34 
Despite all of this, Article 13 passed. Samuelson and Hashimoto observe 
that Barlow “would have been appalled at the curtailment of freedom of 
expression and access to knowledge on the Internet that Articles 11 and 
13 will almost certainly bring about.”35 
 However their view is not entirely, or even mainly, pessimistic. 
They argue that artists have managed to find ways to get compensated 
online, in some cases using methods that Barlow predicted, and conclude 
that the real danger is that attempts to restore pre-digital levels of control 
may actually threaten the attractive features of the network along with 
the illicit activity. 
John Perry Barlow had a vision of an economy of ideas in 
which information would flow freely through the Internet ether. 
While his hope that copyright would disappear in the new creative 
economy is unlikely to transpire, there is some reason to hope that 
policymakers will come to recognize that creative sectors of the 
economy are thriving. Barlow insisted that 
we have a profound responsibility to be better ancestors. 
What we do now will likely determine the productivity and 
freedom of 20 generations of artists yet unborn. So it is 
time to stop speculating about when the new economy of 
 
34 Id. at 109–110 (footnotes omitted). 
35 Id. at 111.  
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ideas will arrive. It’s here. Now comes the hard part, which 
also happens to be the fun part: making it work. 
As a tribute to Barlow, let’s not screw things up by adopting 
stronger copyright rules that will inhibit rather than promote the 
progress of science, as the Constitution directs.36 
Jessica Litman, in her article, Imaginary Bottles,37 also gives 
Barlow high marks for his predictive powers about the digital 
marketplace of the future. 
Some of Barlow’s initial musings on the nature and value of 
information seem startlingly prescient 25 years later. His prediction 
that, in the near future, “information will be generated 
collaboratively by the cyber-tribal hunter-gatherers of Cyberspace,” 
was an eerily accurate description of Twitter. Barlow’s suggestion 
that information itself was supplanting money as our dominant 
currency presaged a future ruled by Google, Facebook, and 
Amazon, three companies that derive much of their monetary value 
from trafficking in information. He proposed that we 
reconceptualize information in the networked digital environment as 
more akin to a living organism than a static package of knowledge. 
As a non-carbon-based life form, Barlow suggested, information 
evolves, spreads, and, over time, it spoils. It creates relationships 
and meaning. Some information’s value depends on exclusivity; 
other information is worth more the more common it becomes.38 
Like Samuelson and Hashimoto, Litman thinks that, 
Barlow might have underestimated the tenacity of legacy copyright 
owners. Despite significant missteps, bad bets, and massive 
investment in stupid initiatives, they seem to have emerged into a 
new world where, from their vantage point, the copyright rules are 
startlingly similar to the rules that governed the old world, only 
better. 39 
When she says “better,” Litman means that, under the guise of protecting 
intellectual property from a digital threat, copyright owners were able—
through technological happenstance, poorly reasoned court decisions or 
legislative fiat—to extend their exclusive rights to actions that copyright 
law had never previously regulated. Litman argues that this was not, as 
many expected it to be, by extending their powers through encryption but 
rather by taking a different approach. 
 
36 Id. at 126 (footnotes omitted). 
37 Jessica Litman, Imaginary Bottles, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 127 (2019). 
38 Id. at 128 (footnotes omitted). 
39 Id. at 128–29. 
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The key to this approach was a breathtakingly expansive 
reinterpretation of the exclusive right to reproduce a work in copies, 
predicated on a very broad definition of “copy.” Fans of this new 
understanding maintain that whenever a work appears in the 
working memory of any computer anywhere, an actionable copy 
has been made, in violation of the statutory reproduction right. By 
insisting, again and again, that the word “copy” had long been 
understood in this broader sense, and by behaving as if they were 
right about that, copyright owners were able to persuade some 
courts that the copyright law, if properly interpreted, afforded them 
extensive rights to control any appearance of their works over 
digital networks.  
The new definition requires some mental gymnastics for readers 
who pay attention to statutory language. The copyright statute has, 
since 1976, defined “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a 
work is fixed.”  Congress hasn’t revised that definition, and 
copyright owners haven’t asked Congress to do so.  Being attached 
to a material object, though, is precisely the characteristic that 
Barlow argued that digital files lack.  The modern revisionist 
interpretation expands the understanding of a “copy” beyond the 
idea of a tangible material object to include temporary and 
ephemeral instantiations. Essentially, it reads the words “material 
objects” out of the statutory definition.  
Over the past 20 years, this expanded meaning of “copy” has 
ceased to be seen as radical. That has allowed copyright owners to 
sell their wine in what I would call make-believe bottles . . . .40  
And thus, over 25 years, we move from selling wine without bottles to 
selling wine in imaginary bottles. All of this was accomplished, Litman 
argues, without much in the way of other changes to copyright law. 
Most of what was idiotic and counterproductive about the ways that 
copyright law worked in 1994 is still idiotic and counterproductive 
in 2019. If the purpose of copyright law is to compensate creators 
for the products of their minds, it hasn’t yet come close to achieving 
that goal. Oodles of money flood into the copyright system. Most of 
that money is siphoned off before it reaches creators’ pockets, and 
where and why the money goes where it goes is kept a closely 
guarded secret. Creators across a wide swathe of fields complain of 
a shocking lack of transparency . . . .  
Yet Barlow’s musings about the organic and volatile nature of 
information remain compelling; they seem even truer today than 
they seemed 25 years ago. Remove information from its containers 
and it spills. Spills spread. As different individual creators and 
 
40 Id. at 131–32 (footnotes omitted).  
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researchers discover closely-held details of how money and rights 
move through the copyright system, that knowledge may itself 
transform the ways that copyright owners do business . . . . Even if 
the heavily fortified legacy copyright system fails to crumble under 
its own weight, a flood of newly revealed information may enable 
the rest of us to piece together a truer picture of where and how the 
system is failing, and what interventions might help creators to 
wrest back some control, or at least some money, from the legacy 
rights holders seeking to preserve the old regime.41  
Jonathan Zittrain is the author of a wonderful book, The Future 
of the Internet: And How to Stop It,42 that explores many of the issues in 
this symposium. In that book, Zittrain argues that the openness of the 
internet does indeed make it vulnerable to misuse, to spam and malware 
and misinformation. Yet he argues that the cure for openness may 
sometimes be more openness. Spam sites originally loaded themselves 
with the words that searchers might look for, making search engines 
useless. Search engines reacted by turning to so called “water hole” 
algorithms, using the links created by the denizens of the network as a 
form of informal peer review, thus once again elevating the real sites to 
the top of search lists. Spammers responded with search engine 
optimization strategies, gamed links and so on—an endless arms race in 
which the open nature of the network is both disease and cure, or at least 
inoculation.  
 In his contribution to this volume, John Perry Barlow’s Call for 
Persuasion Over Power,43 Zittrain muses on copyright law and Barlow’s 
comments about it, noting that even before the digital revolution, 
copyright laws had strayed far indeed from a layperson’s common sense 
understanding of what behavior was regulated.  
A glance at the U.S. copyright code by the time of Napster 
showed just how far Title 17 had quietly diverged from day-to-day 
reality. The idea that singing a song aloud at a birthday party could 
result in thousands of dollars in “damages” was counterintuitive, to 
say the least, even as there’s legitimate rationale for the core 
“performance right” within copyright. The statutory limitations to 
the right are tellingly mincing, such as 17 U.S.C. § 110(6), which 
establishes that notwithstanding the public performance right, there 
are some limited exceptions, such as: 
 
41 Id. at 135–36 (footnotes omitted).  
42 JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 
(2006). 
43 Jonathan L. Zittrain, John Perry Barlow’s Call for Persuasion Over Power, 
18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 137 (2019). 
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performance of a nondramatic musical work by a 
governmental body or a nonprofit agricultural or 
horticultural organization, in the course of an annual 
agricultural or horticultural fair or exhibition conducted by 
such body or organization . . . . 
(It appears to be an open question whether the first gathering by a 
horticultural organization can be “annual” and thus qualify for the 
exception, or if litigants must wait until the following year to see if 
there is another one.)44 
It was this tangled body of law that content owners tried to reformulate 
in the digital age, now always with success.  
Most legislative proposals stalled in Congress, and the lawsuits 
against individual users were retired despite most targeted users 
choosing to settle. This might suggest a victory for Barlow’s way of 
thinking—a certain peace emerged that reformalized commercial 
relationships around activities that, to the users, could still seem 
organic. But the copyright wars didn’t see victory by one side or the 
other so much as a muddling through. Today, the chaos of self-
published Web pages, hosted on individual Web servers, has given 
way to the carefully indexed homogeneity of DMCA-takedown-
friendly Facebook, including the automatic monitoring of private 
chat for the presence of links to file sharing sites (as they are found, 
they are redacted), and Facebook’s silent tracking of all usage for 
the benefit of ad targeting.  
Today music and movies are much less ripped and copied freely 
than they are subscribed and linked to like a utility—via one of a 
handful of streaming titans like Spotify, Tidal, Netflix, or Apple—
with artists seeking to make a living from their work generally no 
better off than they were before the Internet came about . . . .45 
The result, Zittrain argues is a muddle, a tangled mixture of open and 
closed, artist-favoring and artist-exploiting rules. He closes his article 
with an ironic “synecdoche: Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence 
of Cyberspace remains free, but the authoritative version of The 
Economy of Ideas (as rendered in a 1994 issue of WIRED) is . . . metered 
through a paywall.”46 
 In their article, Dancing on the Grave of Copyright?47 Madhavi 
Sunder and Anupam Chander choose what at first might seem a 
 
44 Id. at 138 (footnotes omitted). 
45 Id. at 140 (footnotes omitted). 
46 Id. at 142 (footnotes omitted). 
47 I do have a quibble with their title. They start by telling us that “John Perry 
Barlow would have wanted us dancing on the grave of copyright.” Anupam 
No. 1]                 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW                    56 
 
whimsical topic through which to approach Barlow’s ideas. They argue 
that “Barlow was right about where the economy would go. He was 
wrong that intellectual property would not follow.”48 Thus the subject of 
their contribution to the symposium: 
This essay considers IP in expressions of joy and shared meaning 
online in the form of emotes, GIFS, and memes: the stuff of which 
dreams are made. These aesthetic experiences bring playfulness and 
humanity to the internet. Are they the proper subject of intellectual 
property? Are such forms of cultural innovation and appropriation 
better addressed by ethics or law?49 
Barlow had predicted that the wine would float free of the bottles, that 
citizens would want the experience rather than the packaging it came in. 
Sunder and Chander believe he was correct, but that the law has shifted 
to match the new reality, sometimes in ways that seem overly 
appropriative and controlling. 
Intellectual property, however, has not only survived the doom 
of the information economy—it has thrived. Today, intellectual 
property has fully evolved from goods to a good time. As consumer 
researchers have become savvier about how to package and market 
the human need for fantasy, play, imagination, and haptic 
experience, areas of thought and expression once free as the air we 
breathe are increasingly becoming commodified and metered fare, 
regulated by licenses and royalties, requiring permission and 
payment.  
. . . .  
In recent writing, one of us (Sunder) has repudiated this 
expansion of rights, decrying the threat to fundamentally human 
activity, such as the ability to play, imagine, learn with others, and 
to reference the cultural works that shape our lives and societies. 
Unlike Barlow, the critique does not turn on the form in which 
information is conveyed—that is, bottles or no bottles, in Barlow’s 
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parlance. Rather, the critique is premised on the nature of art itself . 
. . .50 
Sunder and Chander give many examples of the use of copyright law to 
regulate cultural creativity on the microlevel. They conclude by using 
memes to illustrate their point—and to close their article with an actual 
debate in meme form. To get that, you will have to read the article.51 
 Peter Jaszi—who introduced me to copyright law, Ring Lardner 
and a host of other fascinating subjects—has had a central role in 
copyright reforms and attempted copyright reforms over the last 25 
years. Most of all he has seen some of the successful campaigns to derail 
the kinds of copyright expansions that Samuelson and Hashimoto 
decried. In his essay for this volume, What Didn’t Happen: An Essay in 
Speculation,52 he celebrates the power of inaction. 
Some of the last 25 years’ most important positive developments in 
copyright policy have—in fact—been negatives: the collapse of the 
SOPA/PIPA bills in 2012, the congressional failure to enact 
categorical and comprehensive paracopyright legislation in 1998, 
and the long and ultimately successful effort (throughout the mid-
and late-90’s) to block enactment of sui generis database protection 
in U.S. law. The congress’s failure to enact term extension 
legislation (despite having been greenlighted by the Supreme Court 
in Eldred v. Reno) is another example.  
So one minor goal of this essay is to celebrate the power of 
inaction. Another is to acknowledge the pleasure of having your 
predictions proven wrong. I’m happy to say that in 1995 I told a 
Senate panel that a 20-year term extension would be “represent[] a 
down payment on perpetual copyright on the installment plan.” 
Obviously, and happily, it didn’t work out that way . . . .53 
Jaszi’s point is a good one. Most of the Barlowian energy over the last 25 
years has been devoted to a series of attempts to block attempts to 
expand copyright law, sometimes in ways that seemed to threaten 
fundamental and attractive components of the internet. Bills with 
acronym names like SOPA and PIPA tried to make the web safe for 
copyright, but in the process also seemed to make it safe for censorship. 
Jaszi, though, focuses in particular on a series of expansions of copyright 
that affect the network principally in denying to ourselves the ability to 
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use it to share the culture of the past: copyright term extension. He 
focuses on the terms of the debate. 
For decades, arguments on both sides of the issue were primarily 
made in what might be called a “consumerist” frame, with 
crisscrossing claims about whether a more robust public domain 
would (or wouldn’t) offer more conventional information goods at 
lower prices. For many (or most) of that era’s public domain 
advocates, myself included, engaged with the issue primarily, if not 
exclusively, in similar terms. Even the heroes of the early resistance 
to term extension, such as the late Professor Dennis Karjala, cast 
their arguments about the costs of a longer protection period 
primarily in terms of the loss to the public of specific finished 
derivative works (such as motion pictures based on public domain 
originals) that it might bring about—an expanded argument, to be 
sure, but one with roots in the dominant consumerist rhetoric 
nonetheless . . . .  
This narrow, market-oriented understanding of the value of the 
public domain enabled, in turn, another set of tropes, in which the 
public domain was figured as a kind of information limbo in which 
neglected works linger precisely because nobody owns them . . . .54 
But Jaszi argues that both the culture and the terms of the debate have 
changed, in precisely the way that Barlow might have predicted; because 
the network actually changes the way we experience culture. 
Thanks to sweeping changes in the way we think and talk about 
networked digital technology, no one ever again can refer to the 
Internet as a “series of tubes” without major risk of embarrassment.  
What once was viewed as a delivery system is now commonly 
figured as a space for virtual interaction and collaboration—in 
accord with Barlow’s foundational vision.  And it is this shift that 
(in turn) has enabled the emergence of what was for many a whole 
new way to think about the public domain: less as a repository for 
disregarded cultural cast-offs and more as a rich mine of source 
material.  To those of us with an early inchoate sense of the 
potential value inherent in the unowned, it provided a new wealth of 
practical and appealing examples of why the public domain really 
mattered. For others, direct experience online was a powerful 
teacher in its own right . . . .  
 . . . . 
In an environment marked by ubiquitous high-speed Internet 
connectivity, 200 million active websites, and a vast array of 
information tools, the Web hasn’t brought us everything we 
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hoped—and has brought much we might never have wished to see. 
Ultimately, though, it was the Internet itself that came to the rescue 
of copyright’s open spaces. In this at least, John Perry Barlow’s 
organic vision of cyberspace has been realized.55 
The final essay in this volume comes from Charles Nesson, one 
of the creators of Harvard’s Berkman (later Berkman-Klein) Center and a 
person who, like Barlow, embraced the possibilities that the network 
opened up for human freedom. Nesson closes the circle on Barlow’s 
Declaration by offering one of his own; A Declaration of the Mission of 
University in Barlowspace.56 Nesson takes seriously the ills that the 
network has unleashed or magnified, as well as the good that it has done. 
He argues, in fact, that we need closed spaces as well as open ones, 
curated bases of knowledge as well as free-form self-indexing ones. He 
has a candidate for these closed spaces: our universities. 
Universities and schools, on behalf of future generations, I ask 
you to preserve space for freedom of mind into the future. Only in 
such shared mindspace will human liberty of thought survive.  
. . . .  
. . . [T]rust is not an inherent feature of the open net. We must find 
and build trust within closed classrooms within the wider 
environment of the open net. Unless the cyberspace of our future 
contains interior closed spaces in which human trust and freedom of 
mind can live, truth as we have known it will not survive.  
. . . .  
. . . To find freedom of mind amid the enveloping surveillance and 
lurking trolls of the open net has proven to be more difficult than 
many expected. The game is not over. Create space for freedom of 
mind NOW. Let us call it Barlowspace in his honor.57 
*** 
There is much about the contemporary web to make one despair. 
Some of it has to do with the architecture of openness. The freedom and 
anonymity that empowers the dissident also protects the troll. Some of it 
has to do with basic problems in human psychology. We are not as 
rational as we would like to imagine ourselves and the web can be an 
echo chamber in which those psychological flaws are amplified in an 
endless feedback loop. Some of it has to do with regulatory mistakes we 
have made. The fights over net-neutrality or Europe’s Article 13 did not 
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go well. Some has to do with the ability of corporations to replace open 
with closed, to move from the open web to the closed and controlling 
app. Some has to do with forms of economic concentration, arguably 
aided by lax antitrust enforcement, to which the web gives the additional 
winner-take-all power of network effects. In all of this it is particularly 
easy to lose hope, which perhaps explains the vitriol with which 
Barlow’s more hopeful (and naïve) pronouncements were attacked. No 
one is more bitter than the idealist who has lost his faith.  
Yet to succumb to doom and gloom would be a mistake. At the 
beginning of this essay I said “For all intents and purposes, the web that 
is so central to every aspect of your lives today did not exist at all until 
1991. Maybe 1994, if you talk about mediumly-widespread public use. It 
is as if I told you that no one had thought of roads, or wheels, or air, until 
25 years ago.” The converse is also true. We can see the current state of 
the network as so dreadful because we have become complacent about 
all of the good things it brings to our lives, our culture and our economy. 
This has been the greatest democratization of communicative ability in 
the history of the species. And it happened in a space of 25 years. Of 
course not everything went well! Duh! 
We have a long history of fearing openness: I call it cultural 
agoraphobia58—the ability to see the downside of open systems, 
networks and forms of communication with perfect clarity: 20-20 
downside vision—and yet to be blind to the positive possibilities they 
open up. This is not something new. When the Bible was translated into 
the language of the laity, or the franchise opened wide, people 
predicted—often accurately—the evils that would follow. Conflicting 
theologies, religious schism, demagoguery and ugly fanning of mob 
prejudice; it all actually happened. It happened on the network as well. 
Yet, to return to the question asked by my title, no, “the internet is not 
over.” It is 25 years old. Today’s travails should not make us forget what 
we have gained. Honoring the life and thought of John Perry Barlow 
seems a particularly fitting way to do so. 
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